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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE  
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 13 June to 8 December 1967)

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## INTRODUCTION

1. This report on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus covers developments from 13 June to 8 December 1967 and brings up to date the record of the activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to Cyprus.

2. The period under review was marred towards its end by the incidents of 15/16 November at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou, which were among the gravest since the disturbances of 1963/1964, and the situation in Cyprus has undergone a serious deterioration in consequence. There were a number of smaller shooting incidents in the first half of the period, as well as a wave of murders of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in July and August 1967, but had it not been for the major incident referred to above, a considerable reduction in tension, accompanied by progress towards the restoration of more normal conditions, might well have been achieved by the end of the period as a result of certain normalization measures announced by the Cyprus Government at the beginning of September 1967.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

A. Composition and deployment

3. At the end of the period covered by my last report, the strength of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was 4,449 military personnel and 173 Civilian Police (S/7969, para. 3). On 7 December 1967 the composition of the Force was as follows:

<u>Military</u>		<u>Total</u>
Austria	- Field Hospital	54      54
Canada	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	65
	- Battalion and Reconnaissance Squadron	705
	- Contingent HQ and administrative support group	<u>109</u> 879
Denmark	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	34
	- Battalion	<u>623</u> 657
Finland	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	19
	- Battalion	<u>588</u> 607
Ireland	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	18
	- Battalion	<u>507</u> 525
Sweden	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	16
	- Battalion	<u>598</u> 614
United Kingdom	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	145
	- Battalion and Reconnaissance Squadron	852
	- UNFICYP logistic support units	187
	- Helicopter support	<u>43</u> 1,227
	Total military personnel	<u>4,563</u>

<u>Civilian Police</u>	<u>Total</u>
Australia . . . . .	49
Austria . . . . .	45
Denmark . . . . .	40
Sweden . . . . .	40
Total Civilian Police	<u>174</u>
TOTAL UNFICYP:	<u>4,737</u>

4. The following changes took place during the period of this report:

Rotations

(a) Canada: A rotation between 1 and 16 October 1967, in which the 2nd Battalion of The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada and a squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoon Guards were relieved by the 1st Battalion of The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment of Canada) and a squadron of the Fort Garry Horse, involved 545 all ranks. Total strength of the Contingent was increased by four all ranks.

(b) Denmark: A partial rotation between 7 and 23 November 1967, in which DANCON VI was replaced by DANCON VII, involved 168 all ranks. Total strength of the Contingent was increased by 52 all ranks.

(c) Finland: A partial rotation between 15 and 27 September 1967, in which YKSP 7 was replaced by YKSP 8, involved 229 all ranks. Total strength of the Contingent was increased by four.

(d) Ireland: A partial rotation between 11 and 28 September 1967, in which the 8th Infantry Group was replaced by the 9th Infantry Group, involved 304 all ranks. Total strength of the Contingent was decreased by three all ranks.

(e) Sweden: A rotation between 3 and 28 October 1967, in which the 38th Swedish Battalion was replaced by the 39th Swedish Battalion, involved 540 all ranks. Total strength of the Contingent was increased by 28 all ranks.

/...

(f) United Kingdom: A rotation between 20 October 1967 and 4 November 1967, in which the 1st Battalion of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the Royal Green Jackets, involved 542 all ranks. Total strength of the Contingent was increased by 26.

(g) New Zealand: The withdrawal of the New Zealand Civilian Police on 28 June 1967 involved 20 all ranks. No New Zealand personnel are now serving with the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

5. The Force is now deployed as follows (see attached map):

HQ UNFICYP, including HQ UNCIVPOL: Combined staff.

Nicosia West District

Danish Contingent  
Danish Civilian Police  
Austrian Civilian Police

Nicosia East District

Finnish Contingent  
Austrian Civilian Police

Famagusta Zone

Swedish Contingent  
Swedish Civilian Police

Limassol Zone

British Contingent  
Australian Civilian Police

Lefka District

Irish Contingent  
Australian Civilian Police  
Austrian Civilian Police

Kyrenia District

Canadian Contingent  
Danish Civilian Police

6. The Force remains under the command of Lieutenant-General A.E. Martola, while the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus continues to be Mr. B.F. Osorio-Tafall.

B. Function and guiding principles

7. The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was defined by the Security Council, in its resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

That resolution was reaffirmed by the Council in its subsequent resolutions of 13 March, 20 June, 9 August, 25 September and 18 December 1964; 19 March, 15 June, 10 August and 17 December 1965; 16 March, 16 June and 15 December 1966, and in its resolution of 19 June 1967.

8. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force, as summarized in my report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950, para. 7), remain in effect. The duties of the civilian police element of the Force are outlined in my report of 2 May 1964 (S/5679, para. 4).

9. In the Political Liaison Committee, which meets regularly - usually every Thursday - to deal with the problems of implementation of the mandate and questions involving relationships between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot community, the UNFICYP Deputy Chief of Staff, who acts as Chairman, the Senior Political and Legal Adviser and his staff, the Police Adviser and the UNFICYP Chief Economics Officer continue to meet separately with Liaison Officers representing the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. During the period under review, efforts were made by UNFICYP to render the meetings of the Committee more constructive and to accelerate action on matters raised there, and measures to achieve this purpose were discussed both inside and outside the Committee. Some progress has now resulted, but it has not so far been possible to arrange for the Government and Turkish Cypriot representatives to be present simultaneously even at meetings on certain specific issues, as the Government, for reasons of principle, still has reservations regarding the resumption of joint meetings of the Political Liaison Committee, such as those originally held in 1964.



10. Between 13 June and 8 December 1967 the Committee held seventeen meetings with the Government Political Liaison Officer and twenty with the Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officer.

11. During the period covered by this report, UNFICYP suffered no casualties as a result of inter-communal incidents. However, three soldiers were killed and twenty-two hospitalized as a result of road accidents, while one soldier died from natural causes.

12. The discipline, understanding and bearing of the officers and men of the United Nations Force have continued to be of a high order, and reflect great credit on the Contingent Commanders, their staffs, and the armed forces of the contributing countries.

C. Relations with the Government and with the  
Turkish Cypriot leadership

13. During the period under review, UNFICYP has continued to maintain close liaison with the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

14. Efforts were made to remove certain difficulties and misunderstandings which had been experienced in UNFICYP's relations with the National Guard in the last reporting period (S/7969, para. 14). At first, considerable progress was made, both through direct contacts between the UNFICYP Force Commander and the Supreme Commander of the Cyprus armed forces, General Grivas, and through meetings between the UNFICYP Chief of Staff and the Senior Political and Legal Adviser, on the one hand, and the National Guard Chief of Staff on the other. Among the day-to-day problems discussed were possible arrangements for giving UNFICYP the opportunity to try to negotiate a peaceful settlement at the very beginning of an incident, before extreme measures involving the risk of escalation were taken; the elimination of interference with the freedom of movement of UNFICYP patrols; prompt advance notification to UNFICYP of forthcoming National Guard exercises, etc. However, to UNFICYP's regret and dismay, during and following the Ayios Theodoros/Kophinou incidents and their aftermath (S/8248 and addenda), there were a number of instances of hostile behaviour by National Guard elements, such as the forcible disarming at gun-point of UNFICYP soldiers, the disabling or removal of UNFICYP equipment and interference - sometimes accompanied by armed threats - with UNFICYP

patrols, which placed a severe strain on relations between the United Nations Force and the National Guard.

15. About one week after this incident, both the Government - through the Minister of the Interior - and the National Guard expressed profound regret and apologized to UNFICYP about the interference by members of the National Guard with UNFICYP personnel and equipment, and the Government stated that all necessary measures had been taken to prevent a recurrence of such interference. The Government and its security forces further stated that they would do everything possible to return any UNFICYP equipment taken by members of the National Guard and were ready to compensate UNFICYP for the damage done by their soldiers to equipment belonging to the United Nations Force.

16. As far as UNFICYP's relations with the Turkish Cypriot leadership are concerned, what I stated in my last report on this subject (S/7969, para. 15) has remained substantially true of the period under review also. Difficulties with the local Turkish Cypriot leaders have continued to be experienced not only in Larnaca District, but also in Kyrenia District (S/8248/Add.2, para. 6), and incidents have occurred in both Districts where UNFICYP officers and men have been manhandled by Turkish Cypriot fighters.

D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force

17. During the six months covered by the present report, UNFICYP personnel have been denied freedom of movement by the National Guard or by the Turkish Cypriot fighters on fifty-two occasions, on sixteen of which the use of force was threatened. The reported incidents stem largely from the irresponsibility and ill-considered individual initiative of junior ranks in both the National Guard and Turkish Cypriot fighter groups, although on two occasions relatively high-ranking personnel - a Turkish Cypriot fighter warrant officer and a National Guard officer cadet - were not only responsible for stopping United Nations patrols, but also threatening the patrol commanders with violence.

18. The majority - about 40 per cent - of the incidents where UNFICYP personnel were denied freedom of movement occurred in Famagusta Zone, while the most serious incidents, where the lives of United Nations personnel were threatened, took place

in Kyrenia District and at Ayios Theodoros/Kophinou. To a great extent these incidents have taken place in confrontation areas where the forward defences of the opposing sides face each other and where UNFICYP patrols and controls the area in between.

19. One of the most serious of such incidents occurred at Ayios Theodoros and at Kophinou during September. On 16 September 1967, following the refusal of the local Turkish Cypriots to recognize the right of the Cyprus Police to pass through Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas on their way to the mixed village of Ayios Theodoros, a Cyprus Police patrol escorted by UNFICYP was prevented from returning at the end of its patrol and was held in the village for some seven hours. When finally arrangements were made by UNFICYP Headquarters with the Turkish Cypriot leadership in Nicosia for the Cyprus Police Patrol to be given free passage out of the village, these arrangements were initially ignored at the local level, and the commander of the local UNFICYP unit and a senior warrant officer were abused, manhandled and threatened in a dangerous manner with loaded weapons. Only eight days later, on 24 September, the same UNFICYP officer was pummelled and violently pushed by the Turkish Cypriot fighter leader then in charge at Kophinou, who also threatened, without any cause or justification, to shoot him.

20. Earlier, on 19 August, during a National Guard exercise in the course of which an exchange of fire took place between Turkish Cypriot fighters and National Guard soldiers who had strayed off course and come too close to the Turkish Cypriot village of Kambyli, an UNFICYP patrol which had been sent to investigate and effect a cease-fire was threatened by both a National Guard soldier and a National Guard officer. The soldier threatened to shoot the UNFICYP patrol commander and the officer threatened to blindfold him unless he divulged details of the Turkish Cypriot positions.

21. The number of incidents where UNFICYP has been denied freedom of movement is 25 per cent higher than during the previous period, and there is no doubt that UNFICYP's right to move freely around the Island in the execution of its mandate has been often ignored, either because soldiers and their officers have received little or no briefing from their superiors, or else intentionally in order to impair the ability of UNFICYP to carry out its mandate in areas of confrontation. Furthermore, great nervousness and irritability have set in among the ranks of both

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the Turkish Cypriot fighters and the National Guard following the Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou incidents of 15/16 November, and there has been a substantial increase in interference with UNFICYP patrolling (see, for example, S/8248/Add.2, para. 6).

II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING  
AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF  
LAW AND ORDER

A. Military situation

(i) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP

(a) Government armed forces

22. The regular strength of the National Guard has undergone no significant change during the period under review. On 17 July 1967 the remainder of the 1949 age-group, part of which had been exempted until the end of the academic year (S/7969, para. 21), reported for duty. A total of ten age-groups has thus been conscripted into the National Guard since the passing of the Conscription Bill in June 1964. Part of the 1947 age-group, which had been retained for a further six months on completion of the normal 18-month service in February this year by decision of the Council of Ministers (S/7969, para. 21), was demobilized on 2 August 1967. The 1947 age-group is thus the first to do two years' continuous service with the National Guard.

23. On 2 November 1967, the House of Representatives passed a bill extending military service, including that of men already under arms, from eighteen months to two years. The last time the length of National Guard service was altered was in June 1965, when it was extended from twelve to eighteen months (S/6426, para. 22).

24. Earlier, on 11 July 1967, the House of Representatives passed a bill designed to give legal status to the Greek army officers and men serving, hitherto covertly, with the National Guard in Cyprus. This new law empowers the Council of Ministers to authorize the Commander of the National Guard to appoint to the National Guard officers and men who are not citizens of the Cyprus Republic. Under the new law, such officers and men are answerable to the Commander of the National Guard for administrative purposes but are not subject to trial by Cyprus military tribunals for disciplinary offences.

25. The Greek military personnel in Cyprus to whom the new law primarily applies are not part of the Greek National Contingent and UNFICYP has no precise information about their numbers or whereabouts, but they have been an important

element in the Government armed forces for some considerable time and are believed to be rotated through the small port of Boghaz, north of Famagusta, where the same pattern of secretive land and sea activity as in the past has been observed by UNFICYP during the period covered by this report (see S/7969, para. 22).

26. There was increased training activity during the summer months of 1967, when the National Guard carried out a series of large-scale exercises including the employment of armour and artillery. According to an official statement, the main aim of these exercises, which covered large areas of the Island, was to test coastal defences and find out how fast units could be moved to threatened points. The Militia (Home Guard), together with supporting units, also took part in the exercises, which were in addition designed to test the arrangements for mobilizing reservist units, primarily by instructions given over the Cyprus radio service.

27. These exercises have invariably necessitated increased vigilance by UNFICYP, especially where the exercise area included Turkish Cypriot villages, as there was always the risk of incidents in these circumstances. UNFICYP's efforts to obviate such risks by ensuring that Turkish Cypriots in exercise areas are informed and reassured in advance have been generally successful, and although on a few occasions the proximity of armed National Guardsmen has alarmed Turkish Cypriot villagers and caused the local fighters to be alerted, there were no incidents as a result of National Guard exercises in the period under review except on one occasion, at Kambyli (GR R 8183) in Kyrenia District on 18 August.

28. The introduction of military stores into the Island for the National Guard remains the same major problem as it was at the time of my last report (S/7969, para. 26). I then stressed once more that any influx of arms and other military-type equipment into Cyprus is a cause for concern to UNFICYP with regard to the discharge of its mandate. I also recalled, as I had repeatedly done in the past, the agreement of 10 September 1964 (S/6102, para. 129) providing for UNFICYP to be given advance notification of the arrival at Limassol of ships carrying military stores, and for members of the United Nations Force to be admitted to the docks at the time of unloading.

29. During the period under review, shipments of military stores continued to arrive in the Island, many of them at Limassol Harbour, but UNFICYP only once

received advance notification in accordance with the 1964 agreement. Although this notification was given by Headquarters National Guard, the UNFICYP officer-in-charge was refused access to the docks by customs officials. On a number of other occasions members of the Force who had been permitted by the local authorities to enter Limassol docks at times when UNFICYP had reason to believe that the unloading of military stores was impending were prevented from performing their duties by armed National Guardsmen normally stationed at the docks.

30. This denial of UNFICYP's agreed rights is all the more unreasonable because it would appear that most of the military stores introduced through Limassol are maintenance supplies and not new arms or equipment, at least not in any large quantities. Nevertheless, the continued disregard by the responsible officials of the 10 September 1964 agreement is unsatisfactory; despite repeated representations by the Force Commander there has not so far been any improvement in the situation.

31. Another serious feature, to which I have already referred in previous reports (S/7969, para. 26), is that substantial quantities of war material, including heavy equipment, have continued to be introduced through the port of Boghaz, already mentioned in paragraph 25 above, where unloading is invariably carried out in the utmost secrecy, always under cover of darkness, with the National Guard attempting to keep UNFICYP patrols out of the area.

32. The present strength of the regular Cyprus Police is thought to be about 2200, but additional police recruits are still being trained. Recruitment for the Police Tactical Reserve, a para-military force whose establishment is said to be about one battalion, continues steadily (S/7191, para. 28).

33. It will be recalled (S/7969, para. 27), that the Cyprus Government on 12 January 1967 had indicated to the Secretary-General that a quantity of arms imported by it from Czechoslovakia would not be distributed for the time being, that the Secretary-General would be advised in due time if it should become necessary for the arms to be distributed, and that in the meantime the UNFICYP Commander could make periodic inspections to ascertain that there had been no distribution of the arms. Such inspections were carried out from time to time, with the close co-operation of the appropriate officials of the Government.

On 16 and 17 November 1967, however, the Force Commander was informed that the projected next inspection of the arms could not take place and that in view of the threat of bombing by the Turkish Air Force the greater part of the arms had been distributed and the remainder scattered to various parts of the Island to avoid destruction by bombing.

34. In a note of 18 November addressed to the Permanent Representative of Cyprus, the Secretary-General protested this reported action which, if confirmed, would have been contrary to the undertakings to him of the Government of Cyprus, the more particularly so since no advance notice had been given to him or to anyone in UNFICYP. He urgently requested the Government of Cyprus to inform him in appropriate detail of the present disposition and storage of the arms of all categories and to arrange as soon as possible for an inspection by the Commander of UNFICYP of those arms which were still in storage in various parts of the Island.

35. In response to this request, an inspection of the arms by the Force Commander was arranged for 20 November 1967. General Martola found the arms to be in the same storage place as before, except for a number of sub-machine guns and a quantity of ammunition. The information given by the Cyprus authorities to the Force Commander was that a little less than a third of the missing sub-machine guns had been distributed to policemen while the greater part of the remainder had been moved as a safety measure to various police stations in other parts of the country. The removed ammunition had been taken to another storage facility away from Nicosia, where the Force Commander was permitted to see it.

(b) Turkish Cypriot armed elements

36. The various Turkish Cypriot fighter elements do not appear to have undergone any noteworthy changes during the past six months. Training and related activities have followed the same pattern as in the past, and the fighters' state of readiness has by no means been reduced by the passage of time.

37. No reliable figures of the total strength of the Turkish Cypriot armed elements are available to UNFICYP, but UNFICYP's previous estimate of their strength (S/7350, para. 21) remains unchanged. The number of Turkish Cypriot fighters under arms varies with local conditions and the political climate. The local leaders who organize and train the fighters are in many cases professional



military personnel from Turkey who are not members of the Turkish National Contingent (S/7969, para. 31).

38. New weapons of the small arms type, believed to be of local manufacture, have been seen occasionally in the hands of Turkish Cypriot fighters, but there is no evidence, in the opinion of UNFICYP, that the Turkish Cypriots have received weapons or other military equipment from outside the Island during the period under review.

(c) The Greek and Turkish National Contingents

39. To UNFICYP's knowledge there have been no changes in the total strengths of the two National Contingents, which have remained in the locations occupied by them since the end of 1963 (S/5950, para. 26).

40. The relief of approximately half of the Greek National Contingent was carried out on 10/11 July 1967 through the port of Famagusta. UNFICYP was notified in advance.

41. In early July 1967, the Turkish Government, through its Embassy in Nicosia, informed the Government of Cyprus of Turkey's intention to rotate part of its contingent in Cyprus towards the end of September. Lists of stores to be imported by the incoming party were forwarded to the Cyprus Government for approval, and as in the past, UNFICYP was asked to extend its good offices and facilities for the operation.

42. The Government of Cyprus consented to the rotation, but maintained that its attitude towards the Treaty of Alliance was unchanged.

43. At the rotation, which took place on 21 September 1967 through the port of Famagusta, the incoming party consisted of 52 officers and 294 other ranks, plus approximately 150 tons of stores and ammunition, while 51 officers and 293 other ranks left the Island. Neither draft was armed at any time during the operation. Escorts, observers and assistance with road transport were provided by UNFICYP.

44. The rotation gave rise to complaints as a result of the irresponsible actions of some of the outgoing Turkish soldiers who hid stones on their persons before leaving the Turkish National Contingent camp area and then caused damage by throwing these stones at buildings and passing vehicles in the Government-controlled area while being transported to Famagusta Docks under UNFICYP escort. The Turkish authorities expressed regret to UNFICYP for the soldiers'

indisciplined acts and let it be known that those found to have been involved would be punished.

(ii) General assessment of the situation with regard to preventing a recurrence of fighting

45. Briefly, the period under review was marked by a disquieting series of shooting incidents in July and August, followed in September and October by a most welcome move in the direction of greater normality, accompanied by a spell of calm and reduced tension, which was shattered in mid-November by the incidents at Ayios Theodoros /Kophinou.

46. Hopes were raised by the introduction of 2 September 1967 of a number of Government normalization measures, especially in Paphos and Limassol Districts (paras. 91 and 93), which considerably reduced tension not only in these two Districts but in other areas of the Island as well. It was felt that these normalization measures offered the first real chance in a long time for a significant reduction of tension all over the Island on a long-term basis, but from the start the National Guard displayed, to say the least, a lack of interest in the Government's normalization policy. On 15 November, the beneficial effects of the normalization measures in improving understanding between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and reducing tension were swept away - it is not at this time possible to forecast for how long - by the action of the National Guard in resorting to the use of disproportionate force to settle the problem of the restoration of Cyprus Police patrols to the mixed village of Ayios Theodoros, which UNFICYP had been on the point of solving on an agreed long-term basis (S/8248, para. 7).

47. It is the firm opinion of the Special Representative and the Commander of UNFICYP that the normalization efforts inaugurated in Limassol and Paphos Districts must be accompanied by military disengagement and the elimination of the existing areas of close confrontation if at least some of the objectives set forth in my Report S/5671, annex I, are to be achieved. Not only do such confrontation areas unnecessarily keep tension in the Island at a high level, but they are also the scene of frequent incidents and a source of continuing

mistrust and suspicion between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. A typical example is the Artemis Avenue area at Larnaca, which is a hotbed of constant concern and tension but where it would be very easy, given goodwill, for the Government security forces and the Turkish Cypriot fighters to be withdrawn from their dangerously close positions, leaving them unmanned.

B. Specific developments and action taken by UNFICYP

(i) Ayios Theodoros/Kophinou

48. The incidents of 15/16 November 1967 at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou, which caused heavy loss of life and had such grave repercussions, are described in my special report to the Security Council (document S/8248 and Add.1-9).

(ii) Extension and improvement of fortifications

49. In my report of 13 June 1967 (S/7969, para. 45) I pointed out that it had not been possible to bring to a halt the extension and improvement of military fortifications. Despite UNFICYP's continued efforts, both the Government security forces (the National Guard) and the Turkish Cypriot fighters have pressed on with such extension and improvement in the period under review. As has been repeatedly emphasized to both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, and as is stressed in recent reports to the Security Council, this ceaseless building of fortifications which, if continued, will result in the Island being criss-crossed and honeycombed with defences, can only hinder UNFICYP's efforts to reduce tension and to bring about a better atmosphere for normalization in Cyprus: indeed, it even threatens to take away the benefits of the normalization campaign inaugurated in the period under review, as it sows mistrust and suspicion about the real objectives being pursued. UNFICYP is especially concerned over the large number of inland fortifications being constructed by the National Guard, which for the past year has not limited itself as it used to do to the strengthening of coastal defences, but has turned its attention to the interior of the Island.

50. During the period under review, 48 new positions have been constructed by the National Guard, while 52 more have been worked upon and improved. UNFICYP has protested strongly against the National Guard's extensive construction of barbed wire fences in front of National Guard positions around the Turkish Cypriot enclave in Kyrenia District, not only because such fences are considered provocative, but also because they encroach upon the area within which UNFICYP has the right to complete freedom of movement and observation.

51. The Turkish Cypriots, for their part, have constructed 130 new positions, most of them very rudimentary and improved 65 old ones during the period under review. Since the fighting at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou there has been a considerable increase in fortification construction, particularly within the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia and the main enclave. In Nicosia, not only were positions on the Green Line strengthened and new ones constructed, but many road blocks were thrown up on roads leading into the Turkish Cypriot sector and certain roads were blocked off altogether. At Famagusta, during the night of 25 November, extensive defence work was carried out by Turkish Cypriots around the village of Sakharia and astride the road from Famagusta to Salamis, within the recognized defortified area (S/7001, paras. 55-56). UNFICYP made strenuous efforts to have this work stopped on the grounds that it violated the Famagusta arrangement of December 1965 and that this arrangement was still fully valid despite the situation that now existed, but it was not until 27 November that work ceased.

52. Until the threat of war recedes, it is likely that digging, entrenching and fortification construction will continue on both sides. The National Guard have also improved a number of their positions and constructed some new ones, particularly around Nicosia and in Kyrenia District, since the Ayios Theodoros/Kophinou incidents, but the bulk of the defence works have been carried out by Turkish Cypriots. It is to be hoped that as the situation settles down and there is a gradual return to more normal conditions, it will be possible for UNFICYP not only to stop any further work, but to have the majority of the new positions filled in, particularly those within the defortified area of Famagusta.

(iii) Larnaca/Scala

53. The situation along Artemis Avenue, a thoroughfare which passes close to Scala, the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Larnaca, has remained virtually unchanged since the end of the last reporting period (S/7969, paras. 68-69 and 72). The National Guard is still manning the positions on the west side of Artemis Avenue which it occupied on 12/13 May 1967, and from time to time these positions have been improved and extended. Likewise, the Turkish Cypriot fighters have not withdrawn from any of their positions to the east of the Avenue, least of all the controversial position at 41 Artemis Avenue (S/7969, para. 72), and they have in fact constructed some new positions also. The situation in Larnaca is therefore no better than it was six months ago. UNFICYP is of the opinion that until the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters withdraw from their positions on each side of Artemis Avenue and allow the United Nations to establish observation posts in the vacated positions there is unlikely to be any lessening of tension there, and throughout the period under review practically continuous discussions were therefore held by UNFICYP with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership with a view to securing a disengagement. Disengagement has not yet been achieved, but UNFICYP is sparing no effort in its pursuit of this important objective.

54. During the period under review, there have been a number of incidents in the Artemis Avenue area. In July and August 1967, there were several shooting incidents, the most serious of them on 8 August, when some 500 shots were fired. Although no casualties were reported in this incident, some of the shots hit two UNFICYP armoured personnel carriers which were caught in the crossfire.

55. The situation regarding the Hala Sultan Tekke mosque, which I stated in my last report (S/7969, para. 74) was one of the sources of tension at Larnaca, is still the subject of complaints by the Turkish Cypriots. Although the National Guard have moved their posts a little way from the mosque, Turkish Cypriots wishing to visit the shrine still have to pass close to the National Guard, who keep the mosque and its grounds under close scrutiny, and the Turkish Cypriot leadership therefore maintains that there is still not complete freedom of access to this Moslem shrine.

(iv) Limassol

56. Between early June and late August 1967, for the first time in a long period, the quiet situation in Limassol town was disturbed by a number of incidents, several of them involving shooting.

57. Tension in Limassol began to rise around the beginning of the period under review, when the Government took certain measures to counter what it considered provocative actions by the local Turkish Cypriot fighters, who had on several occasions appeared openly in the streets of the Turkish Cypriot quarter in uniform and had abused passing Cyprus Police patrols. One of the measures taken by the Government was to tighten the previously flexibly applied restrictions on the supply of certain goods such as building materials to Limassol Turkish Cypriots, and towards the end of June, on the grounds of an alleged increase in the number of offences committed by local Turkish Cypriots, police reinforcements were moved into Limassol and Cyprus Police patrolling along the edge of the Turkish Cypriot quarter was increased. This called forth a strong reaction from the Turkish Cypriot fighters, and on more than one occasion clashes were averted only through the timely intervention of UNFICYP. Tension was still further increased in July when attempts were made - according to the Turkish Cypriots, in violation of the Constitution - to collect municipal taxes, professional tax and income tax from residents of the Turkish Cypriot sector of the town on pain of prosecution, and although this tax problem was settled satisfactorily, the lingering tension which remained erupted on the night of 24/25 August 1967 into a most serious shooting incident.

58. The immediate cause of this incident appears to have been the hurling of abuse and the throwing of stones by Turkish Cypriots at a Cyprus Police patrol passing through the Turkish quarter of the town. The situation deteriorated, and shots were exchanged, but what caused the incident to assume its final serious proportions was the decision of the local Government

authorities to call in the National Guard to help the Cyprus Police against the Turkish Cypriot fighters. The ensuing firing was indiscriminate and haphazard, endangering the lives of ordinary citizens outside the immediate area of the fighting and causing appreciable property damage in the Turkish Cypriot sector, and it was not until more than five hours after shooting broke out that UNFICYP was able to bring the situation under control and impose a cease-fire. The magnitude and nature of this incident, and particularly the speed with which it escalated to a point where it threatened to run completely out of control, appeared to be a shock to both the District Officer and the local Turkish Cypriot leader, and when the incident was over they both seemed eager to bring the situation back to normal. It was feared that Turkish Victory Day, which the Limassol Turkish Cypriots celebrated with a parade on 30 August, might lead to friction, but the parade was held strictly in accordance with the arrangements made in previous years and passed off without incident.

59. After the incident of 24/25 August, the situation in and around the Turkish Cypriot sector of Limassol rapidly became much calmer, and this improvement was considerably helped by the introduction in early September of the Government's normalization measures covering Limassol and Paphos Districts. The Government security forces, however, have gone about the removal of fortifications - an important part of the normalization programme - in a manner which UNFICYP considers to be half-hearted. UNFICYP had been given to understand by the Government that the National Guard would withdraw their positions on the roofs of three large buildings in Limassol overlooking the Turkish Cypriot sector and would simply post guards in the buildings themselves. However, this has not been done; the National Guard positions on the roofs of the buildings remain, and some of them have been improved or reinforced.

60. Just before 29 October 1967, some concern was caused to UNFICYP by the Limassol Turkish Cypriot fighters' announcement that they intended to hold their parade to celebrate Turkish Independence Day on that date at a place other than that acceptable to the District Officer and to UNFICYP. There was a strong reaction from the Government security forces,

but after strong representations at all levels by UNFICYP the parade was held without incident at the place where it had been held in previous years.

61. As stated above, the situation in Limassol has now become quieter, but it would be a stronger insurance for future peace if on the one hand the local Turkish Cypriot fighter leader were to exercise firmer control and restraint over the activities of his younger elements, and if on the other hand the National Guard were to withdraw completely from their present positions inside Limassol to their camp outside the town.

(v) Paphos District

62. In July and August 1967 the situation in Paphos District deteriorated sharply, largely because of a series of murders and abductions which took place in those months and which are described later in this Report. As a result of these crimes, tension rose acutely throughout the District and considerable apprehension was felt by Greek and Turkish Cypriot alike, to such an extent that in some areas where Greek and Turkish Cypriot villages adjoined one another, villagers would not even venture outside the build-up areas of their villages to cultivate and harvest their fields and orchards. The economic life of a number of villages was seriously affected by this complete cessation of movement, and it was necessary for a time for UNFICYP to organize convoys of essential commodities such as food and arrange escorts for doctors and other essential personnel.

63. As the continuance of such a state of affairs could only inflame the situation and possibly result in more revenge murders, the Special Representative and the Force Commander urged the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to take every possible measure to stop the wave of senseless killings which was paralysing the life of the District, and the Force Commander also asked the UNFICYP Chief of Staff to visit a number of Greek and Turkish Cypriot villages in the area where the murders had taken place in order to discuss with the local village leaders their particular problems and decide how these could best be resolved so as to permit a resumption of normal movement and every-day life. The Chief of Staff also had discussions with the Government District Officer



and the local Turkish Cypriot district leader in order to enlist their help. UNFICYP then put forward a plan whereby neighbouring village mukhtars (official headmen) would be encouraged to meet, under the auspices of UNFICYP, and re-establish confidence in each other with a view to restoring normal relations. This plan was immediately supported by the Government and, after a few days' delay, by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Instructions were issued through the District Officer and the Turkish Cypriot leadership at Ktima to the effect that every encouragement and support was to be given to UNFICYP's plan and the fullest co-operation extended in its execution, and this was done.

64. During the second half of August and the month of September a total of eighteen meetings was arranged, of which all but two actually took place. The aims of the meetings, which were all held in the presence of UNFICYP military representatives, were:

(a) to seek assurances from both Greek and Turkish Cypriot mukhtars regarding freedom of movement through their villages;

(b) to ensure that Greek and Turkish Cypriot agricultural workers could work in their fields without friction or interference; and

(c) to provide a forum for the discussion of possible solutions to inter-communal problems.

65. It was found that there was a great willingness on the part of the mukhtars to co-operate and to meet with their opposite numbers. At some meetings only two mukhtars were present, but at others as many as eight or nine attended. All expressed their gratitude to UNFICYP for making the meetings possible. It was evident to the UNFICYP officers conducting the meetings that many of the mukhtars were delighted to meet their friends of the past and to be able to discuss problems with them. There is no doubt that these meetings helped considerably to secure the rapid restoration of free movement and the resumption of normal activities in Paphos District, and from 2 September 1967 onwards this return to normal was greatly helped by the introduction of the liberalization measures announced by the Government on that date. These measures, which were warmly welcomed by the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of Paphos District, acted as a strong incentive to concentrate on economic progress rather than brood on events of the recent past.

66. UNFICYP has been encouraged by the results of the mukhtars' meetings and it is its intention to extend them, if possible, at a suitable time, to other Zones and Districts as well as repeating them in Paphos District with a view to breaking down the remaining barriers and prejudices and fostering a situation where Greek and Turkish Cypriot mukhtars will meet periodically without the presence of UNFICYP. In this resolve UNFICYP has the Government's support and is confident that it will also receive that of the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

(vi) Mines and booby traps

67. A number of mine and booby trap incidents occurred in August 1967. Three of these occurred in Lefka District, at Apliki (GR R 5760), and four at Alaminos (GR S 1028).

68. On 4 August a booby trap exploded under the wheels of a Turkish Cypriot lorry at Apliki. No one was injured but the lorry was badly damaged. A bomb disposal team seconded to UNFICYP by the British military authorities, who have assisted UNFICYP in the past by lending the services of such experts, was called in, and while the team was investigating the cause of the first explosion, a second occurred which shattered the left foot of the officer in charge of the team, necessitating the amputation of his left leg below the knee, and injured a second member of the team. The area was sealed off until a new bomb disposal team could arrive and start clearing it. No more booby traps or mines were found when this was done, but three days later, on 7 August, another booby trap was found in the same area. This was exploded by the bomb disposal team and after a further thorough search the area was declared clear and opened to traffic on 17 August. All these booby traps were found in places where their victims could be expected to be the Turkish Cypriot workers who normally passed that way. However, investigations have not produced any evidence as to the source of the explosives or the identity of the persons responsible for laying the booby traps.

69. On 12 August an even more serious explosion took place at the village of Alaminos which resulted in the death of five Turkish Cypriots - one man, two youths

and two children - and the blinding and serious wounding of a Turkish Cypriot boy. A week later, a car driven by a Turkish Cypriot ran over a mine on the road between Kophinou and Alaminos, and in the resultant explosion the driver lost his left leg, while his passenger received eye injuries. While this incident was being investigated, a second explosion occurred some 200 metres away which was quite clearly due to a time bomb. A further explosive device was found a day later attached to a water pump close to the village.

70. Naturally this spate of booby trapping and mining in these two areas seriously raised tension for a period, and it was feared that some retaliatory measures might be taken by the Turkish Cypriots, for all these incidents took place in areas inhabited and mainly frequented by Turkish Cypriots. However, tension gradually declined and no further bomb explosions occurred, nor were any more mines or booby traps found. UNFICYP is of the opinion that the sophisticated nature of the devices used in the above incidents and the use of time bombs designed to kill or injure those coming on the scene of the initial explosions indicate that these incidents were not the work of some deranged individual using home-made devices. The activation of the timed device at Alaminos on 19 August could only have been planned to cause injury or death to those who came to investigate the explosion which had taken place a few hours earlier. UNFICYP therefore maintains, although it has not been possible to discover the perpetrators, that these were well-planned attacks originated by people who had access to efficient and sophisticated mechanisms. Such criminal actions would not be possible if the terrorists who committed them were not supported or at least covered by some type of organization. The purpose appears obvious: to maintain tension in an area which is one of the most troublesome in the Island.

(vii) Observance of the cease-fire

71. Shooting incidents during the reporting period are summarized below. The figures for previous reporting periods are also shown, for purposes of comparison.

Zone or District	7 June 1967 to 6 Dec. 1967	6 Dec. 1966 to 6 June 1967	8 June 1966 to 5 Dec. 1966	8 Mar. 1966 to 7 June 1966	2 Dec. 1965 to 7 Mar. 1966
Nicosia West District	26	39	8	2	0
Nicosia East District	11	11	11	3	1
Famagusta Zone	25	31	22	2	0
Limassol Zone	41	8	8	1	4
Lefka District	100	88	76	7	1
Kyrenia District	81	169	164	19	11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>346</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>17</b>

72. While the total number of shooting incidents recorded during this period is lower than for the previous six months, as is the number of proven or suspected breaches of the cease-fire, this total includes several serious incidents and one extremely serious outbreak of fighting in Limassol Zone (see paras. 48 and 56-58). UNFICYP is of the opinion that 22 of the 284 incidents were deliberate breaches of the cease-fire. Three of these occurred in Kyrenia District, two in Famagusta Zone, three in Lefka District, eleven in Limassol Zone, and three in Nicosia West District. Nine were attributed to Turkish Cypriot fighters and 12 to the National Guard. In one case responsibility for firing the first shot could not be determined.

73. The above table shows a substantial decrease in the number of incidents in Kyrenia District and a noticeable decrease in Nicosia West as well. The figures for Nicosia East District and Famagusta Zone remained similar to the previous period, but in Limassol Zone, and to a lesser extent in Lefka District, there was a most decided increase in the number of incidents. Until mid-November, the total number of shooting incidents and breaches of the cease-fire was considerably lower than in a comparable part of the previous reporting period, but during the single week of 14-21 November, which included the Ayios Theodoros/Kophinou incident, there were eight breaches of the cease-fire and 46 separate shooting incidents. The most important incidents are described earlier in this report.

C. Developments relating to the maintenance  
of law and order

(i) The work of the UNFICYP Civilian Police

74. The UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) have continued to work along the broad lines described in my report of 8 December 1966 (S/7611, para. 84) and to make a valuable contribution to the maintenance of law and order in the abnormal conditions prevailing in Cyprus. Their assistance continues to be sought by the Cyprus Police in certain matters where a normal investigation by the latter is precluded by the intercommunal situation. Liaison with the Cyprus Police and the Turkish Cypriot Police element continues to be close at all levels, and members of UNCIVPOL also work in the fullest co-operation with UNFICYP military personnel in the various zones and districts. The acceptance of UNCIVPOL's role by most Greek and Turkish Cypriots has helped UNCIVPOL, as in the past, to bring about an early peaceful settlement of some incidents which might otherwise have escalated to dangerous proportions. The strength and composition of UNCIVPOL have changed only by the replacement of twenty New Zealand Police in June 1967 by ten Australian and ten Austrian policemen.

(ii) Investigation of crime and intercommunal strife

75. Predominant among the matters of a criminal nature relating to intercommunal strife which were investigated by UNCIVPOL during the period under review were a number of murders, shooting incidents and booby trap explosions. Altogether,

twenty-four deaths and eighteen woundings were investigated. Reports of thefts and damage to crops or property decreased slightly, whilst allegations by Turkish Cypriots of ill-treatment at the hands of the Cyprus Police decreased considerably.

76. A series of murders of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Paphos District between 8 July and 18 August led to an explosive situation there, and for some time there was a general unwillingness on the part of Cypriot civilians to travel anywhere in the district. Thus, for example, UNFICYP had to make arrangements to escort many Turkish Cypriot residents of that area who had travelled away from home just prior to the wave of killings and were afraid to return unescorted. In this senseless outbreak of violence, five Greek Cypriot men and two women were killed, four Turkish Cypriot men and one woman suffered the same fate, and two Turkish Cypriot women were wounded. In addition, three Turkish Cypriots from Ktima and two from Ayios Yeoryios disappeared without trace and must now be presumed dead. Details of the killings are given below.

77. On 8 July 1967 a Turkish Cypriot woman was found stabbed to death in a disused store room at Ktima, but this killing probably had no connexion with those that followed, and the first of the series of connected murders is believed to be that which took place on 22 July when a Greek Cypriot mine foreman was shot dead near Polis while returning from work. On 23 July a Turkish Cypriot of Koloni was shot dead and two Turkish Cypriot women were wounded. A Greek Cypriot, said to be a relative of the man killed on 22 July, was arrested by the Cyprus Police and has been committed for trial in January 1968 for the murder of the Turkish Cypriot. On 24 July a Greek Cypriot taxi driver and his passengers, a Greek Cypriot woman and her son, were found shot dead south of Stavrokono, probably as revenge for the killing of the Turkish Cypriot at Koloni on 23 July. Two Turkish Cypriots reported missing on 29 July by their two companions, after allegedly having been attacked by Greek Cypriots on the way back to Ayios Ioannis from Stavrokono, were later found by UNCIVPOL battered to death in a river bed between those villages. On 6 August a Turkish Cypriot woman and her ten-year-old son were found shot dead near Kourtaka. Two Greek Cypriots of Khoulou were

arrested in connexion with this crime but were later released for lack of evidence. A Greek Cypriot of Inia was found battered to death on 10 August at a place where he had been hunting wild bees. Finally, on 18 August, a Turkish Cypriot mine worker was found shot dead at the Limni Mines, probably in retaliation for the murder of 22 July. This was the last in what appears to be a connected series of eleven murders and two woundings.

78. On 18 June 1967 a Turkish Cypriot fighter of Ambelikou was found shot dead at a fighter position about 275 yards away from a National Guard post. Following an exchange of abuse between those positions, UNFICYP had observed a rifle barrel protruding from the National Guard post and had heard a shot fired from that direction. Simultaneously, the Turkish Cypriot fighter fell silent and was found dead a short time later. The National Guard admitted the firing of a shot.

79. Responsibility could not be established for the wounding by shooting of an 18-year-old Turkish Cypriot youth at Limassol on 20 June, but the crime is believed to have been of an intercommunal nature. Four other deaths of Turkish Cypriots are not believed to have had intercommunal implications. Following the events of 15/16 November 1967 at Ayios Theodoros/Kophinou, there were a number of shooting incidents in which two Greek Cypriots were killed and six wounded, but in the light of UNCIVPOL's investigations these incidents appear to have been individually motivated acts of violence. Thus, on 18 November four Greek Cypriots were wounded, two of them not seriously, near various points along the Green Line in Nicosia (see S/8248/Add.1, Para. 4). On 2 November, a Greek Cypriot woman was shot dead and her husband wounded at Avdhellero, allegedly by a Turkish Cypriot from the nearby village of Ghosi (Larnaca District). On 22 November, a Greek Cypriot hunter was found dead, apparently from loss of blood from a leg wound, about three-quarters of a mile from a Turkish Cypriot fighter position near Ambelikou. His shotgun and cartridge belt were missing. Finally, on 28 November, a member of the Cyprus Police on duty on the roof of the Omorphita Police Station near the Green Line in Nicosia was seriously wounded by a shot from a nearby Turkish Cypriot fighter position.

80. During the first five months of the period under review, sixteen booby traps or bomb explosions were investigated by UNCIVPOL, seven of them in the two weeks between 4 and 20 August, when five persons were killed and five others injured

in a series of explosions caused by booby traps. Details of the most serious of these outrages are given earlier in this report.

81. Three bomb explosions in government-controlled areas, which occurred at a brewery, a mine and a charcoal burner's plant and caused only minor damage to property, may have had intercommunal implications but UNCIVPOL has no proof that this is so. Six other explosions directed at property in government-controlled areas had either personal or political, but definitely not intercommunal motives, and Greek Cypriots were arrested by the Cyprus Police in connexion with two of them.

82. Between 19 November and 7 December 1967 there was a wave of thirty-one bomb explosions in government-controlled areas of the Island, including Nicosia, in which no one was seriously injured but extensive damage was done to property. The Cyprus Government asserted that the explosions had intercommunal aspects, but this was categorically denied by the Turkish Cypriots.

83. Serious thefts of livestock from Greek Cypriots, which caused concern during the last reporting period (S/7969, para. 89), have decreased considerably. Investigations in the Chatos area by members of the Turkish Cypriot Police element from Famagusta resulted in the arrest of seventeen Turkish Cypriots, mainly for this type of crime. Two Greek Cypriot-owned cows were quickly recovered and returned to their owner by UNCIVPOL.

84. Considerable Turkish Cypriot unrest was caused at Ktima, in Paphos District, by the sentencing of a 55-year-old Turkish Cypriot of that town to two years' imprisonment for possession of arms and ammunition. The Turkish Cypriot was arrested by the Cyprus Police on 6 June, after he had been observed by a Cyprus Police member of an UNCIVPOL/Cyprus Police joint patrol in Ktima on 29 April 1967 to be wearing a bandolier of ammunition. A strong protest was made by UNFICYP concerning the action of the Cyprus Police in taking advantage of a joint police patrol to obtain evidence of the alleged commission of an offence of this type. In another similar case a Turkish Cypriot of Kazaphani, who was seen in that mixed village by the Cyprus Police on 20 June 1967 wearing military uniform and carrying a rifle, was arrested and kept in custody until 26 September, when he was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment for possession of firearms.



85. UNCIVPOL continues its efforts to locate missing persons. A number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots reported missing during the period under review were quickly located, but six Turkish Cypriots have had to be added to the list of missing persons. Of the four Greek Cypriots added to the list in the report of 13 June 1967 (S/7969, para. 96), one, a twenty-one-year-old National Guardsman, was recovered from the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia in September 1967 and at the same time two Turkish Cypriots who had been missing in a government-controlled area for several days were returned to the Turkish Cypriot side.

86. Only one Turkish Cypriot "defector" was confirmed to have moved to a government-controlled area during the reporting period, but a number of Turkish Cypriots have left the Turkish quarter of Nicosia and gone to other Turkish Cypriot areas to seek employment.

87. Early on 31 October 1967, Mr. Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot President of the Cyprus Turkish Communal Chamber, who had been living in Turkey since 1964, attempted to enter Cyprus secretly by sea and was apprehended shortly after he had landed, together with two other Turkish Cypriots who had accompanied him from Turkey.

88. Mr. Denktash, who had left Cyprus at the beginning of 1964 and was subsequently heard by the Security Council on the question of Cyprus has always contended that he is the victim of de facto banishment by the Cyprus Government. The Government denied this accusation and stated that he was free to return but would have to face criminal charges, for which it had adequate evidence, if he did so. The Turkish Government and Mr. Denktash sought the United Nations good offices in this matter on a number of occasions, but the Cyprus Government's position remained unchanged.

89. After his apprehension, Mr. Denktash was brought to Nicosia; two days later he was remanded for eight days pending investigations and was allowed to see a Turkish Cypriot lawyer. In the first day or two of his detention, tension rose appreciably in Turkish Cypriot areas but seemed to abate somewhat after Mr. Denktash transmitted a message to the Turkish Cypriot community, through his lawyer, reassuring them about his condition and urging them to show restraint. Both the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the Turkish Government requested the

United Nations to extend its good offices with a view to securing Mr. Denktash's release and admission to the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia or, if that were not possible, his return to Turkey. On 12 November 1967, after the United Nations had intervened through its good offices in both Nicosia and New York, Mr. Denktash, together with his two companions, was placed on the scheduled Cyprus Airways flight to Turkey by the Cyprus Government, which cancelled the Cyprus passports of all three men. Following the return to Turkey of Mr. Denktash and the two other Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish Government expressed to the United Nations its appreciation of the good offices extended by the Organization in the matter.

### III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

#### A. General assessment

90. In my Report of 13 June 1967 (S/7969, para. 100) I indicated that despite the seemingly uncompromising attitudes of the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, UNFICYP was persevering with its efforts to make some progress towards a return to normal conditions. It was therefore with considerable satisfaction that I learnt at the beginning of September 1967 that the Cyprus Government had announced a number of "Measures for the normalization of the situation" and had promptly proceeded in putting most of them into effect.

91. The Government's decision was communicated to my Special Representative and the Force Commander at a meeting held at the Presidential Palace on the morning of 2 September 1967 and was made public on the same day in the following terms:

"The Government of the Republic, in its continuous efforts for the restoration of peace in the Island and the creation of conditions conducive to further normality, has decided that:

1. All armed posts and fortifications, with the exception of those intended against external attack, shall remain unmanned.

2. This measure shall be applied initially to the entire district of Paphos and the entire district of Limassol.

3. In the above regions all permanent road-blocks shall be removed and there shall be absolute freedom of movement.

4. These measures shall be extended by stages to other districts of the Island if it is proved during the initial stage of their implementation that they have actually contributed to further relaxation of tension and the creation of a climate of normality.

5. There shall be free access to the Tekke in the district of Larnaca during the day and a Moslem caretaker may stay permanently there at all times.

6. All permanent road-blocks on trunk roads connecting towns shall be removed in all districts.

The Government entertains the hope that the Turkish Cypriot side will show understanding of the spirit in which the above decision was taken."

92. UNFICYP promptly issued a press release to welcome the normalization programme. It expressed the hope that they would constitute a first important step towards a return to normality and the establishment of a more favourable climate for the search for a final solution of the Cyprus problem and that similar measures would soon be extended to other Districts of the Island. In the press release UNFICYP also mentioned that the Turkish Cypriot leadership, for its part, had reiterated its willingness to co-operate with UNFICYP in all matters connected with the return to normal conditions, and had once again given every assurance to UNFICYP that no positions vacated by the National Guard would be militarily occupied by Turkish Cypriots, nor would any other undue advantage be taken of the normalization measures.

93. Within hours of the announcement of the Government's normalization programme, some of the measures began to be put into effect. The permanent roadblocks on trunk roads connecting towns in districts other than Limassol and Paphos Districts were abolished (no static roadblocks had existed in recent times in these two districts), and within a few days Turkish Cypriots in Paphos and Limassol Districts were able for the first time in several years to obtain almost all the goods formerly on the restricted list except those clearly of a military nature. Nowhere in the Island were the normalization measures more welcome than in Paphos District, where they came only a month after a wave of brutal and senseless killings of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots which caused tension in the area to rise to fever pitch and almost paralysed for a number of days the movements of all civilians in that area. Another welcome development which took place at the same time as the application of the normalization measures, though it was not officially part of them, was an immense improvement in conditions at the Famagusta Gate checkpoint in Nicosia (see below).

94. The implementation of the normalization measures of a military nature envisaged in the Government's announcement was much slower in getting under way and was approached with what appeared to be some reluctance on the part of the National Guard, especially in Limassol town itself, where the defortification measures were of lesser scope than had been expected.
95. The Turkish Cypriot leadership's reaction to the Government's normalization measures was cautious and pervaded with suspicion even before the fighting at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou, which took attention away from the benefits of the improved conditions and, in the leadership's view, amply confirmed its own consistent assertions that the initiation of the normalization measures did not mean that there had been any fundamental change in the Government's attitude and aims. First of all, the leadership stressed that the most important point to bear in mind was not that some restrictions had been relaxed in certain areas, but that no such restrictions should ever have been imposed by the Government anywhere in the Island. What the Turkish Cypriot leadership wanted above all was the restoration of its community's constitutional rights and the fulfilment of its political aspirations: only then, it maintained, could there be a return to normality and peace. In justification of its cautious attitude, the Turkish Cypriot leadership invoked certain statements made in connexion with the current normalization measures by senior Government officials and members of the Council of Ministers, which it interpreted to mean that despite all appearances the normalization campaign was designed to lead to the subjugation of all Turkish Cypriots or at any rate to the driving of a wedge between the Turkish Cypriots living outside the main Nicosia enclave and those living inside it. The leadership therefore argued that there was a thinly-veiled political motive behind the Government's decision to embark on its normalization drive. This appeared to be one of the reasons why the Turkish Cypriot leadership seemed so reluctant to reciprocate even to a small extent the relaxation measures taken by the Government.

96. It was noticed by UNFICYP that the suspicious attitude of the leadership was not shared by the Turkish Cypriot masses in Limassol and Paphos Districts, whose reaction to the normalization measures was one of relief and satisfaction. The salutary effect of the measures on the Turkish Cypriots' conditions of life in those Districts was, and continues to be, beyond question. UNFICYP felt that the normalization measures were the most encouraging development for a long time in the Cyprus problem and could well constitute a promising basis for further progress. Indeed, a period of exceptional quiet and calm was noted in most areas of the Island following 2 September 1967. The tragic events of 15/16 November, however, shattered the relative calm and peace, revived hatred between the two communities, and suddenly brought to a halt all progress towards normalization in Cyprus. The fighting bore out, in many Turkish Cypriots' minds, their leadership's warnings that the normalization measures of a few weeks before had been nothing but a probing exercise, and cast a dark shadow across the future prospects for normalization in Cyprus.

97. Nevertheless, and especially in the light of the experience already gained in Paphos and Limassol Districts, UNFICYP remains firmly of the opinion that the real interests of all Cypriots, to say nothing of the cause of peace, can best be served by the extension of the liberalization measures already taken to other Districts, as envisaged in the Government's announcement of 2 September, regardless of any apparent objections on security or other grounds. The President of the Republic was urged to give favourable consideration to this step before the Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou incidents, and UNFICYP's conviction of the rightness and advisability of such a step has only been strengthened by the latter events.

98. During the period under review, a number of items of legislation were passed by the House of Representatives, while other decisions - having effect only in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas of Cyprus - were adopted by the Cyprus Turkish Communal Chamber.

99. Among the items of legislation enacted by the House of Representatives were Laws concerning the Public Service Commission (see S/7611, para.107 and S/7527) and the National Guard (this latter Law provides, inter alia, for the appointment

to the National Guard of persons who are not citizens of the Republic of Cyprus). These legislative measures were strongly criticized by the Turkish Cypriot leadership both on the grounds of their provisions and because, in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriots, the present Government of Cyprus is unconstitutional. On the other hand, consideration by the House of Representatives of a Land Consolidation Bill, about which the Turkish Cypriots had expressed deep anxiety, appears to have been discontinued.

100. On 28 July 1967, the Government of Cyprus passed a Bill, similar to those enacted on about the same dates in 1965 (S/6569, para. 3) and 1966 (S/7611, para.106), extending the terms of office of the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, and the members of the House of Representatives for a third period of up to twelve months in order, it was stated, to ensure the unhindered functioning of the State since conditions precluded the holding of general elections. As in 1965 and 1966, the Turkish Cypriot leadership denounced this measure as devoid of any legal or juridical basis and stated that it made it necessary, "in order to safeguard the fundamental rights of the Turkish Cypriot community under the Constitution", for the Vice-President, Dr. F. Kuchuk, and the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives to take corresponding action to extend further their terms of office. Accordingly, the Turkish Cypriot members of the House met on 5 August 1967 in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia and decided to extend their terms of office and that of Dr. Kuchuk for a period not exceeding twelve months as from 16 August 1967.

#### B. Freedom of movement of the population

101. Freedom of movement for people and goods all over Cyprus has always been one of UNFICYP's main objectives, for it would not be possible to speak of a return to normal conditions as long as that freedom were lacking or seriously restricted. The situation remains far from normal, but the liberalization measures referred to earlier in this Report, brought a welcome improvement in this regard. The events in the Ayios Theodoros/Kophinou area in November 1967 have had a negative effect on freedom of movement, but it is earnestly hoped that this will prove to be only temporary.

102. At the beginning of the period under review, the situation regarding the freedom of movement of the population - both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot - in Cyprus was similar to what it had been for many months past. The Turkish Cypriot leadership denied (and continues to deny) Greek Cypriots access to the Turkish Cypriot enclaves and to most Turkish Cypriot villages at all times, even if accompanied by UNFICYP personnel, while it exercised strict control over Turkish Cypriots leaving the enclaves to visit Government-controlled areas, justifying such restrictions as being in the interests of the Turkish Cypriots themselves who, it maintained, might be ill-treated or arbitrarily arrested by the Cyprus Police at Government checkpoints. The Government for its part, although asserting that there was full freedom of movement for all in the areas controlled by it, nevertheless imposed strict identity checks and searches on Turkish Cypriots at many places in the Island, notably at the Famagusta Gate checkpoint in Nicosia, where there were constant and frequently substantiated Turkish Cypriot complaints of unreasonable delays and excessively thorough searches. UNFICYP had for long been pressing both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reconsider their attitudes to freedom of movement in the areas controlled by them, but had not succeeded in persuading either side to adopt a more liberal policy, although the Government had indicated in the spring of 1967 (S/7969, para. 100) that it was considering taking some liberalization measures when the appropriate time came.

103. The first change in this situation occurred when the Government announced its normalization measures at the beginning of September 1967 and abolished a number of checkpoints on main roads all over the Island (para. 93). These included the well-known checkpoints at Salamis Road, on the outskirts of Famagusta; at Astromeritis, on the main road from the west and south-west of the Island to Nicosia; at Kyrenia, on the road leading to the Turkish Cypriot village of Temblos; and at several other less important points in Famagusta and Lefka Districts. Some Turkish Cypriots had expressed the fear that these static checkpoints would be replaced by mobile Cyprus Police checkpoints, but no



significant increase in the number of checks carried out by mobile Cyprus Police units has been observed. Furthermore, when such checks have been carried out they appear to have been for normal police purposes such as verifying licences of vehicles and drivers and ensuring that other provisions of the road traffic law are complied with. Since the Cyprus Police personnel were withdrawn from the checkpoint on the road leading to Temblos, two members of the National Guard, who first appeared at the checkpoint two or three months before it was abolished, have continued to be stationed at a fixed post there and have occasionally stopped vehicles, but generally speaking it can be said that there is freedom of movement on that road.

104. One of the most welcome developments concerning freedom of movement during the period under review was the great improvement in the situation at the Famagusta Gate checkpoint in Nicosia. Ever since its establishment, this checkpoint had been the subject of constant Turkish Cypriot complaints of excessive delays, meticulous searches and a number of abuses, some of them substantiated by UNFICYP. Indeed, in the second half of July and the first half of August 1967 it was an almost daily occurrence for Turkish Cypriot trucks, many of them carrying perishable goods, to be held up at the Famagusta Gate for three hours or more. My Special Representative drew the Government's attention to this undesirable situation several times during this period, as he had done several times in the past, and on 4 September 1967 (two days after the announcement of the Government normalization measures) the Minister of the Interior visited the checkpoint personally. From the day of the Minister's visit, a great improvement was observed by UNFICYP in the situation at the checkpoint, and this improvement remained in effect thereafter. The average waiting time was reduced to about 3-4 minutes, and this improvement was reflected in the increase in the number of Turkish Cypriot vehicles passing through the checkpoint from a maximum of 350-400 per day in previous reporting periods to an average of 600-700 after conditions improved. Even on Sundays, when no goods traffic is permitted, about 150 Turkish Cypriot vehicles were observed to pass through the Famagusta Gate. The improvement in the situation at the Famagusta

Gate is known to be appreciated by the majority of Turkish Cypriot travellers, to whom the long delays in the past were a great inconvenience and hardship. Following the fighting at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou in mid-November 1967, intensive searching of Turkish Cypriot vehicles, with consequent longer delays, was resumed by the Cyprus Police, but it is hoped that this deterioration in the situation at the Famagusta Gate will be of short duration.

105. For some weeks at the end of July and the beginning of August, the free movement of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Paphos District was severely reduced because of widespread fear resulting from the series of murders of members of both communities between 23 July and 18 August. (paras. 76-77).

In order to encourage the resumption of travel in the area, UNFICYP organized convoys along the main routes and took other measures to reassure the travelling public. These measures were successful, and helped considerably in dispelling the atmosphere of fear and mutual distrust in Paphos District, as also did the UNFICYP-organized meetings between Greek and Turkish Cypriot mukhtars (para. 65).

106. It can be said that, for the average Turkish Cypriot - even if resident in the main Turkish Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia - the period under review has been marked by some improvement in freedom of movement around the Island, although the Turkish Cypriot leadership asserts that Turkish Cypriots are still far from enjoying full freedom of movement and that the Government allows them only such freedom in this respect as it finds convenient at any given time.

In support of this contention the leadership points to such cases as that of three Turkish Cypriot journalists who travelled from the Turkish quarter of Nicosia to Kophinou on 17 November 1967, two days after the fighting at the latter place, in order to take pictures and make notes on the incident, but whose films and notes were seen by UNCIVPOL observers to be confiscated by Cyprus Police personnel when the journalists passed through the Famagusta Gate checkpoint on their way back to the Turkish quarter of Nicosia.

107. While freedom of movement has improved for Turkish Cypriots, there has been no change in the situation for Greek Cypriots, who are still rigorously excluded from many Turkish Cypriot areas and can only pass through others under

UNFICYP escort or supervision, as in the case of the Kyrenia Road or the road running through the Limnitis enclave. Although my Special Representative has repeatedly urged the Turkish Cypriot leadership to adopt a more liberal attitude, the road through the Kokkina enclave remains closed to Greek Cypriots, necessitating a detour of many miles, and Greek Cypriots are still not allowed to use the Kythrea-Lefkoniko road (S/7969, para. 100) or the road from Trypimeni through Knodhara (S/7350, paras. 49-54, and S/7418).

108. As far as foreign travel is concerned, the situation for Turkish Cypriots has undergone little change in the period under review. Turkish Cypriots are as free to leave the Island as Greek Cypriots, but the ban on the return of Turkish Cypriot students from Turkey continues to be enforced, and in practice any young Turkish Cypriot who goes to Turkey even for a short time may experience serious difficulties in re-entering Cyprus.

109. The thrice-weekly direct air service by Turkish Airlines and Cyprus Airways between Nicosia and Turkey, which was resumed after a gap of two years in May 1967 (S/7969, para. 116), has operated without incident since that date. During the period under review, direct passenger and cargo sea links were also re-established between Cyprus and Turkish ports and have likewise operated without incident.

110. There have been no complaints of assaults on Turkish Cypriots at Cyprus Police checkpoints since the announcement of the Government's normalization measures, but there were several accusations of ill-treatment of arrested Turkish Cypriots at the hands of the Cyprus Police earlier in the period under review. The Turkish Cypriots in question were examined by UNFICYP Medical Officers and some were found to be suffering from injuries of varying gravity which appeared to be consistent with ill-treatment of the type alleged by them. All these cases were brought to the attention of the Government.

111. In the period under review, there have been a number of instances of co-operation between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, mostly in public works such as the repair of the bridge on the main road at Limnitis, which had been severely damaged by floods earlier in the year; the repair of the main road between Xeros and Kato Pyrgos, which is in the same neighbourhood and passes

through several Turkish Cypriot areas; the repair of a section of the Nicosia-Limassol main highway in a highly sensitive Turkish Cypriot-controlled area, just in front of the Kophinou police station compound where various serious incidents occurred last March between Turkish Cypriots and UNFICYP troops (S/7969, para. 56); the inspection and overhauling of electricity distribution installations in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia; and the completion of the spillway and associated works of the Kanli Keuy dam in the main Turkish Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia (S/7969, paras. 115 and 137).

112. In my Report of 13 June 1967 (S/7969, para. 118) I said that it was my undiminished conviction that the significant liberalization of freedom of personal movement in Cyprus could have only the most beneficial effects. The fighting at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou has done nothing to alter this conviction: indeed, it can only be through redoubled efforts to restore normality, including normal freedom of movement, that there can be any hope of removing the bitter aftermath of those events. It is therefore my earnest hope that the Government will soon find it possible to take further measures towards the restoration of full freedom of personal movement throughout the area under its control - a course of action which would be made easier if the Turkish Cypriot leadership, for its part, could see its way towards removing the restrictions on freedom of movement imposed by it in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas.

### C. Efforts to restore normal economic activities

#### Introduction

113. A feature of the inter-communal economic situation since the outbreak of the disturbances has been the contrast between the basically unimpaired and growing prosperity of the residents of Government-controlled areas and the widespread unemployment, poverty, general fall in the standard of living, and virtual cessation of all economic activities but agriculture and small retail commerce caused by the emergency in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. This

regrettable contrast has remained as striking as ever during the period under review, but there is now some hope that it may be reduced in the near future in Limassol and Paphos Districts. The recent normalization measures there have practically eliminated the economic restrictions which prevented the Turkish Cypriots from emerging from economic stagnation, while even in other districts, there appears to have been a slight easing of the economic restrictions previously applied with considerable strictness to the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants.

114. The restrictions imposed by the Government on the supply to Turkish Cypriots of a wide range of items considered to be of actual or potential strategic value have always been one of the Turkish Cypriots' main grievances. Since the object of the Government restrictions was not only to prevent the Turkish Cypriots from obtaining anything which could be considered as of military use, but also to prevent them from building permanent accommodation for the 20,000 or so Turkish Cypriot refugees who had fled from their villages and upon whom the Government wished to exert maximum pressure to return to their original homes, few manufactured goods or raw materials have been exempt from possible seizure at Cyprus Police checkpoints. The "restricted" goods, which are either completely denied to Turkish Cypriots or which can only be obtained by permission of the local District Officer - permission rarely sought by Turkish Cypriots because of their reluctance to make application to the Government for anything, the likelihood of a refusal, and the long waits in Government offices often involved - include among the prohibited items all building materials, black tar, and all kinds of plastic piping, while the articles which can only be obtained with the local District Officer's permission include firewood, water pipes and fittings, and all automobile spare parts. The only parts of the Island which are still subject to rigorously applied economic restrictions of this type are the main Turkish Cypriot enclave (including the Turkish quarter of Nicosia) and Kokkina. The principal aim of these restrictions is to prevent the consolidation of the main Turkish Cypriot enclave as a viable self-contained unit and to discourage the permanent settlement there of the large number of

refugees who entered it after the disturbances. A strict ban is therefore maintained on the entry into the enclave of any building or road-mending materials. Restrictions are also maintained on the amount of petrol taken into the enclave in the tanks of Turkish Cypriot vehicles, and checks are carried out to this end at the Famagusta Gate checkpoint, although less than 2 per cent of the total number of vehicles in a day are usually sent back from the checkpoint for having too much petrol. Despite these restrictions, however, building materials have been released and permitted to enter the main enclave in connexion with two specific projects during the period under review: the modernization in the interests of public health of a slaughterhouse at Orta Keuy, and the completion of the spillway of the Kanli Keuy dam (S/7969, para. 137). In the first case, the amount of building materials involved is small, but in the case of the dam quite large quantities of materials have been released, including some 2,800 bags of cement, 14 tons of reinforcing steel, 7 cubic yards of timber and 900 cubic yards of sand and gravel aggregate. The work on the dam is regularly inspected by a Government official, while the use of the building materials is strictly supervised by UNFICYP representatives, who keep the unused materials under guard at a special UNFICYP outpost at the dam site.

#### Industry

115. Standing monuments to the failure so far to restore normality to commercial life in Cyprus are, on the one hand, the three valuable Greek Cypriot-owned industrial enterprises - a limekiln and quarry, a flour mill and a textile plant - which remain idle because they are in Turkish Cypriot areas and their owners and technical staff cannot gain access to them, and on the other hand the several more modest Turkish Cypriot-owned enterprises which are likewise enforcedly idle, either because they are in the main Turkish Cypriot enclave and are therefore unable to obtain raw materials on account of Government restrictions, or else because, as in the case of the Ambelikou limekiln, they are in places where Turkish Cypriots do not consider it safe to go.

116. UNFICYP has always considered it most regrettable that industrial and commercial enterprises should be kept inactive because of the political situation, and despite the failure of a determined attempt to negotiate the re-opening of Greek and Turkish Cypriot-owned factories in 1966 (S/7350, paras. 115-117), it was felt that a further attempt should be made in view of the recent inauguration of the Government's normalization measures. A joint meeting was therefore arranged under UNFICYP auspices between the Chairman of the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and a representative of the Turkish Cypriot business interests on 24 October 1967. At this meeting, which was held in a frank and friendly atmosphere, the representative of the Turkish Cypriots restated their position that meaningful discussions on this subject could only be held if the stringent economic restrictions, particularly on building materials, imposed on Turkish Cypriots living in the main enclave were removed. It would be beyond the comprehension of the Turkish Cypriot community, he said, if Greek Cypriot factories were allowed to function in the main enclave while the Turkish Cypriots living there were still unable to obtain even modest quantities of building materials for use under UNFICYP supervision to keep their houses in repair and make emergency repairs to the roads in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. On the other hand it was clear at the meeting that the Greek Cypriots took the view that the Turkish Cypriot leadership, for its part, would have to relax its strict policy of denying access to the main enclave to all Greek Cypriots, and if the factories were to function again, the Government would insist that the factory owners and staff be given easy access to their premises, it being understood that the reactivated factories would also employ Turkish Cypriots, as in the past. The matter is now under consideration by the Government and by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, and it is hoped that both parties will soon be willing to relax at least some of the present restrictions affecting the main enclave so that the regrettable enforced idleness of the industrial enterprises concerned may be brought to an end.

Agriculture

117. On the whole, the period under review has been a satisfactory one as far as inter-communal co-operation and understanding over agricultural matters has been concerned. There have been few serious disputes or new problems, and generally speaking Greek and Turkish Cypriot farmers have been able to proceed with their work unhindered by political considerations.

118. By far the biggest problem in agriculture is the question of unauthorized cultivation. Large areas of agricultural land in Cyprus are being cultivated by persons who are neither the owners of the land nor tenants in the normal sense of the word. When the disturbances broke out in December 1963 and early 1964, many Turkish Cypriot farmers fled from their land, while some Greek Cypriot farmers found themselves unable to gain access to land which they owned in what had become Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Outside the main Turkish Cypriot enclave, UNFICYP has succeeded in many cases in arranging leasing or share-cropping agreements between the owners of land and its present users, but no progress has yet been possible over the payment by the Turkish Cypriots of compensation for their cultivation of Greek Cypriot-owned land in the main enclave, especially in the Dhikomo area.

UNFICYP had some limited success in establishing better inter-communal understanding over unauthorized cultivation in two areas outside the main enclave, at Mathiati and Peristerona (both in Nicosia District), where informal meetings of Greek and Turkish Cypriot farmers were arranged by UNFICYP, but attempts to arrange ad hoc meetings of farmers and land-owners on a larger scale to deal with broader aspects of unauthorized cultivation came to nothing when the Government declined to engage in such meetings, although the Turkish Cypriot leadership had indicated its willingness to send representatives. Leaving aside the land inside the main Turkish Cypriot enclave, however, there is reason to believe that the gradual extension of the Government's normalization measures to districts other than Limassol and Paphos Districts would create a situation in which unauthorized cultivation would cease to be a major problem.



119. In my Report of 13 June 1967 (S/7969, para. 128) reference is made to the mutually satisfactory arrangements concluded this year between the Turkish Cypriot grain producers and the Cyprus Grain Commission for the purchase of the former's 1967 grain crop. It is gratifying to report that these arrangements have worked satisfactorily all over the Island and even the high level of tension which prevailed for some weeks in Paphos District did not prevent the satisfactory completion of Turkish Cypriot barley and wheat deliveries to the Grain Commission in that district.

120. The picking and sale of other crops such as carobs, grapes, olives and lemons has also taken place without serious difficulties. UNFICYP negotiated various harvesting arrangements benefiting Greek and Turkish Cypriot growers alike in confrontation areas, and by and large these arrangements have worked satisfactorily.

121. An improvement has also been observed in the situation regarding the use of agricultural machinery by Turkish Cypriots. The most striking improvement in this field has, of course, been in Paphos and Limassol Districts, where Turkish Cypriot farmers, thanks to the normalization measures introduced in September 1967, are now able to obtain everything they need, from tractors and trucks down to timber and nails, as easily as their Greek Cypriot neighbours. In other districts, except in Turkish Cypriot enclaves, Turkish Cypriot farmers have not complained of any difficulty in operating their agricultural machinery, although they are not allowed to buy new trucks or tractors and must apply to the local District Officer for allocations of tractor fuel. The only area where the use of agricultural machinery is still a matter of some difficulty is the main Turkish Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia, where most of the tractors are very badly worn because new tractors are not allowed into the enclave and it is difficult to obtain spare parts for the existing ones. Work on the Kanli Keuy dam, for example, has been somewhat slower than hoped for because of the inadequacy and poor mechanical condition of the earth-moving equipment available. During the 1967 grain harvest in the main enclave it was noticeable that harvesting operations were frequently held up by breakdowns of tractors or combine harvesters, even the most recent of which are now very close to the end of their useful life.

122. The Government has continued to provide the necessary vaccines for Turkish Cypriot livestock during the period under review, but some difficulties have recently arisen over the method of distribution. Previously the Turkish Cypriot veterinary staff requested the vaccines they needed from the Government through UNFICYP, which received the vaccines and passed them on to the Turkish Cypriot veterinary service, but in October 1967 the Government indicated that it wished the Turkish Cypriot veterinary service to apply to it directly for vaccines, which would then be distributed to the Turkish Cypriot veterinary staff in the various districts by the Government District Veterinary Officer. The Turkish Cypriot leadership objected to this procedure, pointing out that it would undermine their centralized veterinary administration, which was essential both for administrative reasons and because most of their veterinary staff in the districts were not fully qualified and needed control and guidance from the leadership in Nicosia.

#### Water and electricity supplies

123. After the very rainy winter of 1966/1967, there have been few problems of water supply in Cyprus during the period under review, and the main questions dealt with in this field have concerned the drinking water supply to Scala (the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Larnaca) and the completion of the Kanli Keuy dam.

124. Water supplies to Scala have long been a source of complaint. For several summers past there has been an acute but sporadic shortage of fresh water in many parts of Scala during the warm season, when water consumption is at its height. It has never been established who or what is responsible for the fluctuations in the Scala water supply. The water shortage has been attributed by the Turkish Cypriots to deliberate interference with the supply by Greek Cypriot water officials, who are in a position to control the flow of water to Scala, but officials of the Larnaca Water Board deny any interference with the supply and claim that water shortages in Scala are due to the very poor condition of the water system there, parts of which are very old. In the summer of 1967, tension

rose to a high level in Scala on account of this water shortage, and in order to clarify the true situation UNFICYP proposed to install water metres on the supply mains where they entered the quarter, in order to establish exactly how much water was being allowed into Scala. The Larnaca District Officer authorized this experiment for a short period, and towards the end of August water metres were installed by UNFICYP technicians. They remained in place for some three weeks, during which time they showed a reasonable flow of water into Scala and there were fewer complaints of water shortage. When they were removed in September, the weather had become cooler, and since that time there have been no complaints of water shortages.

125. The most important and encouraging development concerning water supplies during the period under review is the Government's decision, in response to the recommendations of the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme in Cyprus and the various approaches made by UNFICYP, to authorize the release of the building materials needed to complete the spillway of the Kanli Keuy dam (S/7969, paras. 134-137). This dam was constructed with the participation of United Nations technical assistance experts, and at the outbreak of the disturbances in December 1963 it was complete except for the spillway. For some years it was of necessity neglected, as materials were not available in the main Turkish Cypriot enclave for its maintenance or completion, and in February 1967, after a period of torrential rain, the dam began to overflow in a manner made all the more dangerous by the absence of a proper spillway. Emergency repairs became necessary to ward off the danger of the dam bursting and flooding a substantial area, with possible danger to human life. At that time, the UNDP experts concerned in the "first aid" measures stated that those emergency repairs were only of a temporary nature, and that as long as the spillway remained uncompleted there would be a danger that prolonged heavy rain might once again lead to a critical situation. UNFICYP and UNDP therefore continued their efforts to secure the release of materials to complete the spillway, and in July 1967 the Government approved the release of all the necessary materials, including fuel and spare parts for the Turkish Cypriot earth-moving machinery which would be used. Measures were immediately taken

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to set the work afoot in order that it might, if possible, be completed before the onset of the rainy season. So far, the Government departments and officials involved have done everything possible to facilitate and expedite the execution of the work by the prompt issue of the necessary clearances and by full co-operation with UNFICYP and with the Turkish Cypriot engineers working on the project.

D. Measures to assist refugees and other distressed persons

126. When the disturbances broke out in December 1963 and continued in the first part of 1964, thousands of Turkish Cypriots fled from their homes, taking with them only what they could drive or carry, and sought refuge in what they considered to be safer Turkish Cypriot villages and areas. Almost all Turkish Cypriot villages and quarters opened their doors to substantial numbers of refugees; some places, such as Kokkina and the Turkish Cypriot sectors of Ktima and Polis, received a very heavy influx of refugees which led to serious problems of accommodation and unemployment. Altogether some 20,000 Turkish Cypriots are estimated to have fled from their homes at the beginning of the disturbances, and it has not been possible to bring about any substantial reduction in this number, for the reasons given below.

127. For some considerable time, the Government has urged the refugees to return to their homes, assuring them that they will be in safety there, and in some villages it has repaired or rebuilt abandoned Turkish Cypriot houses in the hope that this would attract some Turkish Cypriot families back to their homes. In support of this policy, the Government has prevented building materials from being taken into areas where there are many refugees, so as to prevent the construction of permanent accommodation in which the refugees could settle down and in which they would tend to lose the incentive to return to their original homes. These measures have so far been of no avail, however, and despite the unsatisfactory existence which they lead in the most overcrowded refugee centres, such as Kokkina, where housing facilities are so inadequate as to create a health hazard and where there is not enough land or other natural

resources to provide employment for more than a few men, Turkish Cypriot refugees have as a rule not returned home. It is known that the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return of the refugees to their former homes located in Government-controlled areas at present. To justify this position, the Turkish Cypriot leadership stresses considerations of security and safety of the refugees, although there can be little doubt that one of the major reasons for its attitude is a political one, namely that as long as no acceptable political solution has been found, the maximum possible number of Turkish Cypriots must remain outside the Government's authority.

128. By far the most unsatisfactory of all the refugee centres is Kokkina. For almost four years this small area of infertile and uneven coastal land has sheltered a refugee population so overcrowded as to leave no room for any significant exploitation of the soil. In these conditions, despite the departure for Turkey of several hundred young men during the past eighteen months (S/7191, paras. 48-52 and S/7969, para. 116), some 1,200 refugees still lead an uncomfortable, unhealthy and meaningless existence, most of them housed in tents and all of them dependent for food and clothing on the weekly Red Crescent convoys which bring relief supplies donated by Turkey from storage points in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. Although the Government allows adequate supplies of food and clothing to be transported to Kokkina, requests for permission to send other items there are the subject of lengthy consideration and are frequently refused. Thus, a request to the District Office (Nicosia) for clearance to supply to Kokkina some asbestos piping needed for the irrigation of a small vegetable plot was first submitted in the spring of 1967, in the hope that clearance would be granted in time for the piping to be used for irrigation that summer, but clearance was not granted until October 1967, when irrigation was no longer needed. Still more serious are the almost invariably long delays in considering applications for clearance for small quantities of building materials needed for repairs to the few permanent dwellings in Kokkina. Such delays cannot even be explained by the Government's policy of preventing the entry into refugee areas of materials which could be used for building permanent

accommodation, for the quantities involved are so small that it is evident that the materials are required only for emergency repairs. Nevertheless, even though it was accompanied by an UNFICYP Medical Officer's report stating that defective roofing in Kokkina was a hazard to the refugees' health, and notwithstanding the diagnosis of two cases of tuberculosis among the inhabitants, a request for clearance for some tiles to repair the faulty roofs of existing houses has not yet been approved by the District Office (Nicosia) in spite of the fact that winter is drawing nearer. The Government has repeatedly said that the refugees in Kokkina are free to return to their villages in the surrounding area, and it has also indicated that the stringent restrictions on the movements of those living in Kokkina would be relaxed if the section of the Polis-Xeros road running through the enclave were opened to Greek Cypriot traffic. However, the Turkish Cypriots have not agreed to either of these courses of action, maintaining, as far as returning to their villages is concerned, that this is out of the question as long as National Guard units and detachments of the Cyprus Police remain in the vicinity.

129. During the period under review, and indeed during the whole of 1967 so far, there has not been a further shipment of Red Crescent relief supplies. The last such shipment was the twelfth, which arrived in Cyprus on 20 December 1966. In my report of 13 June 1967 (S/7969, para. 147) it was stated that on 28 March 1967 the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia indicated to the Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a new Red Crescent shipment, consisting mainly of clothes, footwear and medical supplies, was envisaged at an early date, and a little later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that it had no objection to such a shipment, subject to the payment of customs duty on certain items. On 5 August 1967, the Turkish Embassy again informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it was planned to make the new shipment soon, and on 9 September 1967 the Embassy asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to use its good offices to secure the duty-free importation of the items on which customs duty was demanded, stressing that the clothing and footwear in the shipment consisted almost entirely of used and old articles donated by individuals and private

organizations in Turkey. On 7 October 1967, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to the Turkish Embassy's letters, repeating that the Cyprus Government had no objection to the importation of the relief material, subject to the payment of customs duty on the items already enumerated by it. On 19 October 1967, the Turkish Embassy wrote again to the Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reiterating that the items in the shipment were mostly charitable gifts of negligible economic value and pointing out that it was a widely accepted principle that relief material for charitable purposes should not be subjected to the same rules as those applied to the importation of commercial goods. The Ministry's reply to the Turkish Embassy on 3 November was that despite careful reconsideration of the matter the Cyprus Government's position remained unchanged. UNFICYP continues, as always, to keep in contact with both sides and to extend its good offices with a view to securing a satisfactory outcome of the matter.

#### E. Normalization of the public services

##### Introduction

130. When the disturbances began in December 1963 the hitherto integrated administration of the Cyprus public services broke down immediately in the areas of greatest tension, and it was not long before this breakdown spread all over the Island as Greek Cypriot public servants left their offices in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas and vice versa. Those public utilities such as water and electricity supplies, which are essential to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots and cannot easily be operated and administered in a segregated manner, either continued without interruption or were quickly restored and have continued to function ever since for the common good. Pending a political settlement, other less essential public services have been administered separately by the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership in the areas under their respective control. There is a third category of public services, however, such as the postal services, the issue of documents of national and international validity (birth certificates, deeds of property ownership, passports, etc.) and the payment of social insurance benefits, which cannot be separately administered, and it is these public services which UNFICYP has concentrated on normalizing, in some cases with success.

Postal services

131. From December 1963 until October 1966 many Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, including the Turkish quarter of Nicosia and the main enclave, were deprived of all postal service. On 15 October 1966, an ad hoc postal arrangement was concluded through UNFICYP's good offices, providing for the restoration of letter deliveries in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia and in Lefka (S/7611, paras. 145-148). Within its limited scope this arrangement has worked satisfactorily since it came into effect.

132. Welcome as it was, the above arrangement covered only two areas, leaving many Turkish Cypriot villages still without postal services, and even in Nicosia and Lefka it did not provide for parcel post, postal draft or Post Office box services. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has therefore been pressing for the extension of the October 1966 postal arrangement to cover these additional fields. UNFICYP has held a number of discussions on this matter with the Ministry of Communications and Works and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The Ministry has indicated its willingness to extend the postal arrangement to cover the Turkish Cypriot villages to which postal services have not been restored, but is not prepared to authorize parcel post, postal draft and Post Office box services in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas because those facilities can only be supplied under the supervision of full-fledged postal officials and not the "postal agents" who now operate the mail delivery services in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia and in Lefka. The Ministry's requirements for the extension of mail deliveries to the remaining Turkish Cypriot villages are now under consideration by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

Land records

133. At the end of 1963, the Nicosia District land records, which were kept in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, were no longer available to the Department of Lands and Surveys, causing such disruption to property transactions that the Government considered enacting a law for the establishment of new land registers; this gave rise to considerable controversy (S/7191, paras. 128-132). Fortunately, UNFICYP was able to negotiate with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership an ad hoc land records arrangement (S/7611, paras. 149-155) which made available



the Nicosia District land records, under UNFICYP supervision and on UNFICYP premises. This arrangement made it unnecessary for the Government to proceed with its proposed legislation. Since its conclusion in the autumn of 1966, the arrangement has worked smoothly, benefiting both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In October 1967 the Department of Lands and Surveys elevated the office on UNFICYP premises, where transactions involving Turkish Cypriot property are carried out, to the status of an official sub-office.

#### Social insurance benefits

134. When the disturbances broke out in December 1963 most Turkish Cypriots stopped contributing to the national social insurance scheme and the Government ceased paying social insurance benefits to all Turkish Cypriots except those who continued to live in government-controlled areas. It is estimated that, at the present time, at least 25,000 eligible Turkish Cypriots are not contributing to the scheme, while some 6,000 Turkish Cypriots are paying their social insurance contributions. However, those living in Turkish Cypriot enclaves are nevertheless deprived of benefits under the scheme because government social insurance inspectors cannot visit their places of residence. In March 1966 UNFICYP arranged for the resumption from that date of payments of old-age and widows' pensions to Turkish Cypriots living in the enclaves who were entitled to such benefits prior to the December 1963 disturbances, but no arrears of benefit from December 1963 to March 1966 have been paid.

135. During the period under review there have been no changes in the position regarding the payment of social insurance benefits to Turkish Cypriots. Discussions between the chief Turkish Cypriot social insurance specialist and officials of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance continued during this period. They were useful in clarifying a number of points, but the problem of the resumption of Turkish Cypriot participation in the national social insurance scheme remains unsolved. Following an approach by the General Secretary of the Cyprus Turkish Trade Union Federation to the Director-General of the International Labour Organisation in June 1967, the ILO asked one of its experts attached to the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance in Cyprus to look into the technical aspects of the Turkish Cypriots' social insurance position and to advise the ILO on

the relevant technical questions. The expert undertook a detailed study of the problem of resuming Turkish Cypriot participation in the national social insurance scheme and considered a number of possible solutions. His report has now been submitted to the International Labour Office.

Payment of rent to Turkish Cypriot owners of property occupied by UNFICYP

136. In October 1965 (S/7191, paras. 122-123), UNFICYP worked out with the Cyprus Government arrangements for the assessment and payment of rent by the Government to Turkish Cypriot owners of property occupied by UNFICYP for operational purposes. One of the recurrent problems in the implementation of these arrangements has been the assessment of the rental value of property which, more often than not, is located in a confrontation area where the Government declines to send its official assessors on the grounds of safety. During the period under review, slight progress has been made in securing the assessment of property in a few areas of minor confrontation; some more Turkish Cypriot property owners have begun to receive payment from the Government, while the applications for rent of some other owners are being processed. Nevertheless, despite UNFICYP's efforts aimed at a rapid settlement of rental claims by the Ministry of Communications and Works, Turkish Cypriots continue to complain energetically, as they did in the preceding period, of the long lag between their submission of a rental claim and the receipt of the first rental payment from the Government.

Problems of public revenue

137. No meaningful developments were observed in the period under review regarding the public revenue problems caused by the present abnormal situation in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots continue to refuse to make any payments to the Government which they can possibly avoid, on the grounds that the latter is unconstitutional and that they are its creditors for very large sums of money on many accounts. They contend that the Government continues to withhold from the Turkish Cypriot leadership and individual Turkish Cypriots many payments, ranging from the annual grant to the Cyprus Turkish Communal Chamber to the pensions of retired Turkish Cypriot teachers and civil servants (S/7969, para. 155), which were made without question before the outbreak of the conflict.

138. In the early part of the period under review, the municipal authorities in the government-controlled sector of Nicosia and in Limassol made attempts to levy certain local taxes on Turkish Cypriots. A number of Turkish Cypriots who refused to pay these taxes were summoned to appear in court, and tension rose to some extent in the two areas. The Turkish Cypriots maintained that under the 1960 Constitution such local taxes should be levied on a community basis, that is, Greek Cypriot municipalities would levy the taxes only on Greek Cypriots and the same would apply to Turkish Cypriot municipalities. The Government does not recognize the continued validity of this provision. After UNFICYP had extended its good offices, the collection of local taxes from Turkish Cypriots and the court cases pending against a number of Turkish Cypriots for non-payment of such taxes were not pursued.

139. Ever since December 1963, Turkish Cypriots in certain areas, notably the main enclave and the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, have refused to pay their electricity and water bills although they have continued benefiting from these public utilities. It was reported that the Turkish Cypriot leadership had collected certain sums from Turkish Cypriots for electricity and water consumed and had placed this money in a "frozen" bank account against an eventual settlement of the problems of public revenue. In October 1967, the Turkish Cypriot leadership publicly announced that it would henceforth levy certain charges (not on the basis of current Electricity Authority of Cyprus tariffs) on Turkish Cypriots living in the main enclave and the Turkish quarter of Nicosia for their consumption of electricity. The money so collected would be deposited in a frozen bank account against a possible final solution of the Cyprus problem.

F. The functioning of the law courts and the  
administration of justice

140. Over the period under review, the situation regarding the judiciary has remained as described in my previous reports to the Security Council, in particular S/7969, paras. 158-162 and S/7611, paras. 166-174.

141. The work of the Courts of the Republic continues to be confined as a rule to cases where the litigants are Greek Cypriots, except where Turkish Cypriots accused of offences are apprehended by the Cyprus Police and brought to court for trial.

142. The Turkish Cypriot judges continue to stay away from the Courts of the Republic, and it is understood that ad hoc judicial proceedings, outside the normal system of courts, continue to be held in certain Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, especially the main enclave which includes the Turkish quarter of Nicosia.

IV. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE  
SECRETARY-GENERAL IN CYPRUS

143. During the period under review the good offices of my Special Representative in Cyprus continued to be available to all the directly interested parties for the purpose of promoting and assisting in any negotiations designed to ease local problems, to explore issues of a broader nature, or to contribute to the creation of a more favourable atmosphere for further consultations.

144. Acting on my instructions in the context of his broadened responsibilities (S/7180), and after previously consulting the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, my Special Representative visited Ankara and Athens during the period 20-27 July 1967. The purpose of this visit was twofold: to establish personal contacts in both capitals with the governmental officials dealing with questions involving Cyprus, and to consider measures which UNFICYP could take under its mandate in order to help to restore normality in Cyprus so as to establish a better climate of calm and mutual confidence that might facilitate an eventual solution of the basic problems.

145. My Special Representative reported to me that the atmosphere of his talks in both capitals was extremely warm and that the conversations in Ankara and Athens were conducted with complete frankness and understanding and covered practically all aspects of the thorny and painful Cyprus question. Both Governments expressed to my Special Representative, as they had already done on a previous occasion to his predecessor (S/7350, para. 161), their gratitude for UNFICYP's untiring efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of law and order, and to help to restore normal conditions of life to the Island.

146. As my Special Representative went to Athens and Ankara at the time when Greece and Turkey were engaged in a dialogue which covered, inter alia, the question of Cyprus, he carried no proposals and did not enter into detailed discussions about the basic issues involved, but he reported to me that he found a genuine interest in both capitals in finding a mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem.

147. On returning to Nicosia, my Special Representative conveyed to President Makarios and to Vice-President Kuchuk the salient points of the conversations he had had in Ankara and Athens.

V. MEDIATION EFFORT

148. The situation regarding a resumption of the mediation function under paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 has remained unchanged since my last report, owing primarily to the widely differing and firmly held views on the matter of the three Governments most directly concerned.

VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

149. The costs to be borne by the Organization for the operation of UNFICYP for the forty-five month period from its inception on 27 March 1964 to 26 December 1967 are estimated at \$79,295,000. This total does not include an estimate of \$610,000 which would be required for the final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs.

150. As at 8 December 1967, payments and pledges of voluntary contributions received from forty-five Member States and four non-member Governments to cover these costs total the equivalent of \$72,747,524. To the above amount may be added \$400,000 which had been received as at 30 November 1967 from interest earned on investment of temporarily surplus funds, public contributions and gains on exchange.

151. Accordingly, unless additional pledges are received, there will be a deficit on 26 December 1967 in the amount of approximately \$6,150,000.

152. If the Security Council should decide to extend beyond 26 December 1967 the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus, it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization, including the amount of \$610,000 as the cost of final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs, assuming continuance of reimbursement commitments, would be as follows:

UNFICYP Cost Estimates by Major Categories of Expense  
 (in thousands of U.S. dollars)

<u>Operating Costs incurred by the United Nations</u>	<u>For a three-month extension</u>	<u>For a six-month extension</u>
Movement of Contingents	705	870
Operational Expenses	542	1,065
Rental of Premises	50	100
Rations	276	551
Non-Military Personnel, Salaries, Travel, etc.	323	606
Miscellaneous and Contingencies	104	108
Total, Part I	2,000	3,300

Reimbursement of Extra Costs to Governments Providing Contingents

Pay and Allowances	3,300	6,600
Contingent-owned Equipment	400	800
Death and Disability Awards	<u>50</u>	<u>100</u>
Total, Part II	3,750	7,500
Grand Total, Part I and Part II	<u>5,750</u>	<u>10,800</u>

153. The above estimates do not reflect the full cost of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States since they exclude the extra costs which Members providing contingents or police units to the Force have agreed to absorb at their own expense rather than to seek as reimbursement from the United Nations. Based on reports received from certain of the Governments providing contingents or police units to the Force, the estimated amount of such extra costs which the Governments would absorb at their own expense in respect of the extended period, in the event the mandate of UNFICYP were extended and the Governments concerned agreed to continue the present arrangements, are as follows:

	<u>For a three-</u> <u>month extension</u>	<u>For a six-</u> <u>month extension</u>
	\$	\$
Austria	55,169	110,337
Australia	93,075	186,150
Canada <sup>1/</sup>	561,215	905,140
Denmark	120,000	240,000
Ireland	260,500	521,000
United Kingdom	325,000	650,000

Finland and Sweden are also absorbing certain UNFICYP costs at their own expense.

154. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for an extended period after 26 December 1967, and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to 26 December 1967, it will be necessary for the Secretary-General to receive pledges totalling \$11,900,000 for a three-month extension and \$16,950,000 for a six-month extension.

<sup>1/</sup> Exclusive of the cost of normal pay and allowances.



## VII. OBSERVATIONS

155. The recent events in the Island and their very serious repercussions have shown how precarious the situation regarding Cyprus remains and how easily and rapidly, in spite of the best efforts of UNFICYP, relatively small incidents can develop into an imminent threat to international peace.

156. I have already reported to the Council the three appeals which I made to the parties during the recent crisis and their replies to them, as well as the efforts of my Personal Representative, Mr. José Kholz-Bennet (S/8248/Add.3-9). These appeals included a call to avoid all acts of force or the threats of recourse to force; a particular plea to the Governments of Greece and Turkey to take immediate measures to end any threat to the security of either one by the other as well as of Cyprus and, as a first step, to carry an expeditious withdrawal of those of their forces in excess of their respective contingents in Cyprus. I also said that such reductions, which would need to be in stages, should envisage the ultimate withdrawal from the Island of all non-Cypriot armed forces, other than those of the United Nations. This would make possible the positive demilitarization of Cyprus and would be a decisive step toward securing peace on the Island. I further stated that, with regard to any further role that it might be considered desirable for UNFICYP to undertake, I gathered that this could involve, subject to the necessary action by the Security Council, enlarging the mandate of the Force so as to give it broader functions in regard to the realization of quiet and peace in Cyprus, including supervision of disarmament and the devising of practical arrangements to safeguard internal security, embracing the safety of all the people of Cyprus. The response of the parties to these appeals was encouraging and does, I believe, provide a basis for the parties and the Security Council to consider the various issues involved, leading toward further positive steps in the search for a durable solution of the Cyprus question.

157. Throughout the recent crisis regarding Cyprus, the world lived through very anxious days, witnessing a chain of events that seemed to be leading inexorably to an armed conflagration. It was possible, at the eleventh hour, to stem the tide

but it is of the utmost urgency now to act with speed and determination in the search for a lasting solution to the Cyprus question. While the mediation effort required by the Security Council in its original resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/RES/186 (1964)) has been inoperative for some time because of the impasse, with which the Council is well acquainted, following the submission of Mr. Galo Plaza's report (S/6352), neither the parties nor the Security Council can afford to allow the situation regarding Cyprus to stumble from crisis to deeper crisis and from danger to graver danger. I wish to urge all concerned, therefore, to seize the opportunity emerging from the recent crisis and to display the statesmanship and goodwill which is essential to resolve this complex and long-standing question. I wish to reiterate that my good offices continue to be available to the parties and to the Security Council to this end.

158. The renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP is one obvious step for the maintenance of peace in Cyprus, and I recommend to the Council that it extend UNFICYP for another period, whether of six or of three months. What steps over and above this extension can be taken by the Council in consultation with the parties is, of course, for the Council itself to determine.

159. I would conclude this report by drawing attention once again to the continuing precariousness of the situation regarding Cyprus and by expressing the hope that the parties and the Council will proceed with urgency to intensive consideration of ways and means of preventing a recurrence of conflict and of finding a basis for the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

